

Next Generation Nuclear Security: Meeting the Global Challenge

End of Day Summary

April 12, 2010

Hosted by the Fissile Materials Working Group

Morning Keynote: Robert Gallucci

- Nuclear terrorism is a real threat, must take it seriously.
- US and Western Europe not only targets.
- Threaten consequences for negligence.
- Must deny nuclear weapons armed adversary access to our territory.
- Look upstream and deny terrorists access to fissile materials.
- Stop producing HEU or separating more plutonium.
- Use gold standard in securing existing fissile materials.
- Eliminate the fissile material by blending down.

Panel One: Regional Progress and Challenges

- Cooperation is key in Latin America which has a unique regional approach, including leadership by the nuclear industry.
- If you are not improving your security, it is declining.
- Security culture important for NGO, industry, government.
- Countries beyond the US and Europe must be worried as they are also targets of nuclear terrorism.
- More nuclear materials, more risk of nuclear terrorism.
- Much has been done in Russia and the FSU but much more needs to be done to ensure sustainability of technology, training, and equipment.

Panel Two: Rethinking Multilateral Approaches

- There is great momentum in 2010 to break the Cold War paralysis but success will require political will.
- Need an international forum for practitioners to share best practices. WINS provides that.
- Take small steps to improve big picture, especially through the IAEA process.
- International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) serves as one model for cooperation on fissile material.
- International organizations need to change with the world, especially the IAEA.

Lunch Keynote: Gareth Evans

- Finish unfinished business:
- Governments need to exercise great care in using plutonium, especially MOX, and ensure robust security measures at every point in the supply chain.
- Proliferation - resistant approaches will be key. Share more widely Generation IV International Forum to develop reactors and associated fuel cycle technologies that are proliferation-resistant.
- Nuclear security is too important to be left to national governments unaided.
- Every country has a stake in the effectiveness of security measures everywhere else.

Panel Three: Eliminating the Civil Use of HEU

- No need for HEU fueled reactors.
- While expensive, you can convert from HEU to LEU.
- Need good management, strategy, and cooperation between technical and political people. Must be commercially sustainable.
- HEU is the easiest terrorist weapon.

Panel Four: Where Do We Go from Here?

- Need for a new fissile material security framework - public, private partnerships are crucial.
- A political and technological culture shift is necessary to create a next generation nuclear security regime.
- Visible sustained leadership to change public perceptions.

Disagreements

- Whether to continue plutonium reprocessing.
- Priority of nuclear security vs. nonproliferation and the NPT.
- The appropriate balance between national and multinational actors/institutions.
- The appropriate balance between voluntary and mandated actions.